Before the "open door" policy doi moi, the Vietnamese government had monopolised all sectors of tourism in the country. In 1987, one year after the beginning of doi moi, the state issued the 
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Vietnam's Open Door Policy
Doi Moi
In 1986, the Congress of Vietnam introduced an economic programme called doi moi (Renovation) , which has been compared to Gorbachev's contemporaneous glasnost campaign in the Soviet Union. The Vietnamese Communist Party's new policy called for measures including the decentralisation of the planning system, a decrease in the number of government ministries and bureaucracies, reliance on the private sector as an engine of economic growth, and allowing state and privately-owned industries to trade directly in foreign and international markets. Doi moi has succeeded remarkably in moving the country from a stagnant, centrally planned Sovietstyle economy with macroeconomic instability to a socialist-oriented mixed market-oriented economy characterised by rapid growth (Kokko, 1998: 2) . Developments such as the end of the 
Doi Moi and Tourism
With these political and economic shifts, Vietnam has become a much more accessible and attractive destination in the international tourism market and has been rediscovered by tourists from around the world. Consequently, Vietnam's tourism industry has experienced a period of 3 meteoric growth in recent years. Over 4.1 million international tourists arrived in Vietnam in 2007, an increase of over ten-fold since 1990 (www.vietnamtourism.com/e_pages/news/ index.asp?loai=2&uid=6751). Tourism accommodation and travel agencies in Vietnam earned a total of 10,743.5 billion dong (USD 670 million) in 2004, compared to 4,458.5 billion dong (USD 280 million) in 2000 (www.gso.gov.vn) . It has been predicted that earnings from foreign visitors to Vietnam in 2010 will reach USD 11.8 billion (Sadi and Henderson, 2001: 70) . As of 2006, an estimated 234,000 people worked in Vietnam's tourism sector, with another 510,000 jobs in related industries (John, 2006) . Aside from this quantifiable growth, tourism in Vietnam has also changed in character during the years since 1986. Vietnam's tourism industry is experiencing the emergence of new tourism niches, new kinds of attractions and businesses, new breeds of tourists and unfamiliar types of tourism such as eco-tourism and war tourism. Far from being merely a side-effect of economic and political changes in Vietnam, growth and change in the tourism sector has also generated effects that have an influence on politics, economics and 
Methodology
Challenges and Limitations
Research in Vietnam is still associated with certain problems, and there is relatively little published research on tourism in Vietnam. The English language literature on this subject is very limited. The authors also found that most government organisations are either not willing to share information and documents, or that the statistics in question do not exist or were never recorded (Henderson, 2000; .
Many researchers and scholars have referred to this lack of reliable and accurate basic statistical information data for Vietnam, and in addition, the country lacks continuous historical data on the development of tourism Mok and Lam, 1998; EIU, 1993; Henderson, 2000; Theuns, 1997) . Insufficient standardisation or coordination of measuring periods and time spans from province to province or from year to year, inadequate training, resources and interdepartmental coordination are all likely contribute to this problem, as does increasing forgery, smuggling and falsification of documents to meet a growing demand by researchers and organisations for data that may not exist in the form required .
It has been said that the open door policy has seemingly brought Vietnam's communist government to realise the need to improve the reliability and availability of data in order to attract potential foreign investors who need trustworthy and consistent statistics as a basis for their development strategies (EIU, 1993; Mok and Lam, 1998 This study investigates changes in tourism that occurred during the first years of the twenty first century. However, some of the data referenced in this paper comes from the period between the beginning of doi moi and the turn of the century, in order to provide a context for the developments that led in to this situation. Political and financial events of recent years make it difficult to extrapolate the trends identified in this paper into subsequent years or the future.
Choice of Methods
The use of key interviews was chosen as the principal method of gathering data for this paper, and the research combines a series of interviews conducted by the lead author with administrative figures in two international hotel chains, seven state owned hotels and three guesthouses at different locations in Vietnam. These were supplemented with interviews with a senior expert in hotels from the Vietnam National Administration of Tourism (VNAT) and a senior official of the Foreign Investment Agency, Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI).
Desk research from secondary sources including government documents, newspapers and periodicals supplemented the information gathered from the interviews.
Firms, organisations and individuals that have been active in Vietnam tourism from before doi moi were primarily sought out for interviews, in order to get insight into patterns over a longer period of time, even before the beginning of doi moi. Because of the government monopoly on 6 tourism businesses before 1986, state-owned hotels and firms in Vietnam tended to be the longest-established and thus were specially targeted for interviews. Interviewees were also chosen from foreign firms, FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) and other private enterprises that have been operating in Vietnam since at least the beginning of the development of private and FDI enterprises in Vietnam tourism as part of doi moi. To gain an understanding of tourism policy changes from the vantage point of the makers and enforcers of this policy, interviews were also conducted with representatives of government bodies.
A semi-structured interview form was used, involving the implementation of a number of predetermined questions and/or special topics, asked of each interviewee in a consistent and systematic order, but allowing the interviewer sufficient freedom to digress in order to probe beyond the immediate answers to the predetermined questions. New issues often arose during an interview, which led the interviewer to ask additional questions to probe a certain direction.
Such questions varied among interviewees. One examples of this is a line of questioning regarding hotel room prices that revealed patterns in changes of accommodation development, supply and demand since the beginning of doi moi.
Multiple lines of questioning of different interviewees at different levels or sectors were used to validate and cross-check interview results, such as the interviewing of private, state-owned and international operators as well as representatives of the VNAT regarding the development of the accommodation sector. Representatives of government bodies were often in a position to verify the results of interviews with representatives of tourism businesses and data from other primary sources.
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Contribution
A 2004 survey of representatives of the investment promotion agencies of more than 50 nations (most of them developing countries) determined that tourism is one of the main industries being targeted by these countries for FDI (Endo, 2006: 601) . While dealing specifically with Vietnam, this paper contributes to knowledge on investment in the developing world in general, and socialist countries in particular. It offers specific insights into the ways in which the introduction of aspects of a free market economy into a socialist system affects the risks and opportunities for investment. Through the use of elite interviews, the research gives an understanding of how such a broad macro-economic transition affects, and is affected by, individual tourism operators. It goes beyond the discussion of the purely economic and political aspects of the investment climate within political transition to reveal the workings of mechanisms of knowledge transfer and cultural negotiation between public and private, domestic and foreign, established and startup interests in this context.
FDI/Joint Ventures in Vietnam
Legal Framework
In 1987, a new foreign investment law was inaugurated, encouraging foreign investment by offering enticing conditions for joint enterprises and foreign-owned corporations. The Law on Foreign Investment opened the Vietnamese market to investment by foreign firms and persons and guaranteed them rights of ownership and fair treatment including freedom from 8 expropriation and nationalization of assets. In order to encourage opportunities for transfer of capital and expertise, the law favours joint ventures over the other models of foreign investment (Ngo Ba Thanh, 1993: 95) Foreign investment is allowed in all economic sectors but specifically encouraged in several specific niches, among them 'foreign exchange earning services' such as ship repair, air-and seaport services and tourism (Theuns, 1997: 312) . In the original version of the Law, foreign firms were to be liable to pay tax on their profits at a rate of between five and ten per cent, though tax exemption could be granted in special cases to encourage investment (Law on 9 Foreign Investment, 1987: Article 33). The only areas from which foreign investment was explicitly excluded by the Law on Foreign Investment were those related to national security (Wayne and Lejeune, 1996: 203) .
Early Development of FDI
In the period 1987 to 1995, foreign investment in Vietnam totaled USD 20.63 billion. By 1996, FDI in Vietnam was the second highest of any country in the world, as a percentage of GDP (Freeman, 2002: 5) . According to Vasavakul, in the mid 1990s tourism was the most popular sector for foreign investment, accounting for over USD 3.3 billion. (1997: 348) However, in 1996, FDI declined for the first time since doi moi was adopted, and economic growth dropped to 4 per cent. Analysts have commented that some aspects of the Renovation Program are nothing more than empty rhetoric on the part of the government, and foreign investors may have come to the realization that the country's political climate may not have been as open as was originally assumed as shown, by the 1996 campaign to abolish 'social evils' which called for the prohibition of signs in foreign languages (Batha, 2000) . Many internal factors may also have contributed to Vietnam's economic downturn, such as an excess of bureaucracy, which discouraged investment, a complicated and opaque system of rules and regulations, widespread corruption in the government and banking systems and favouritism for thousands of dysfunctional State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) (Thayer, 2000) . The downturn in 10 FDI was exacerbated by the Asian financial crisis of 1997. The most fundamental obstacle for foreign investors was the Hanoi government itself (Hines, 2000) , which had introduced doi moi in 1986 "not out of altruism, but because its hand was forced" (Mitton, 1998) . The VCP has been accused of having taken two steps forward and one step back (ibid).
Encouraging FDI
In order to encourage investors from countries from outside the region, in 1998 the Agency Encouraging FDI is a central concern behind market-oriented policy reforms in Vietnam. FDI is seen as a catalyst for economic transition and revitalization of the private economic sector (ADB, 2006: 10) . Yasheng (2001 , cited in Freeman, 2002 pointed out that FDI has served as a sort of "ersatz private sector" in China, which, like Vietnam, has a transitional economy, associated with a low-level of domestic private economic development and a sluggish public sector.
Vietnam's bountiful natural resources and low labor rates, as well as the relatively high education level and pronounced work ethic of the Vietnamese people, contribute to the attractiveness of the country for foreign investors (Freeman, 2002: 4) . However, encouraging foreign investment in Vietnam proved difficult because of a lack of technological capability and 11 managerial experience in the country. The infrastructure, destroyed during the War, was in a sorry state. The press criticized the administration for having difficulty in abandoning the 'guerrilla mentality' and making the transition from a wartime to a peacetime society (Duiker, 1995: 145) . Growth in the private sector and foreign direct investment (FDI) were concentrated mainly in the South, where better infrastructure, longer personal and business relations with Vietnamese and Chinese abroad, and a supportive local administration created a more favorable environment than in the North (Dodsworth, et al, 1996: 16) 
Contribution of FDI
Retrospective assessments of the significance of the contribution of FDI to the Vietnamese economy vary, according to which indicator is cited. At the end of the 1990s, foreign direct 12 investment companies accounted for 13 per cent of Vietnam's GDP, 27 per cent of its non-oil exports, 35 per cent of industrial production and one-quarter of tax revenues. In the year 2000, the total revenues from FDI in Vietnam were USD 6.5 billion and tax income from FDIs was USD 280 million (Freeman, 2002: 3) . However, the FDI sector accounted for only a small proportion of total employment in the country: 2 per cent in 2000 and 0.6 per cent overall between 1991 and 2000 (Leproux and Brooks, 2004: 12) . In 2001, the World Bank estimated that average total investment in Vietnam would have to attain a level of 30 percent of the GDP by 2010 (5 percent higher than in the 1990s). A government reform program aims at reducing state sector investment to encourage investment from the private sector (Tenev, et al., 2003: 1-2 (Li, et al, 1998) . However, six years later, foreign investors had gained enough experience in Vietnam to feel confident enough to avoid the complications of domestic partners by increasingly deciding for 100 per cent ownership of their projects.
FDI in tourism in Vietnam
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Twenty per cent of the USD 30 billion of FDI pledged to Vietnam between 1988 and 1997 was designated for tourism (Sadi and Henderson, 2001: 71) . FDI in tourism in Vietnam grew from USD 7.4 million (2 per cent of total FDI) in 1988 to USD 1.9 billion (30.7 per cent of total FDI) in 1995, increasing by around 100 per cent yearly. The number of projects remained more or less constant, but the average size of projects undertaken grew steadily from year to year, from USD 1.4 million in 1988 to USD 66.7 million in 1995. An increase in the average duration of tourism FDI projects from 9 years to 27 years over the same period reflects the growth in the size of projects undertaken and also indicates an increase in investor confidence in the Vietnam tourism market. Accounting for USD 1.3 billion in funds, Taiwan was by far the largest source of the investment in Vietnamese tourism in the eight years from 1988 to 1995 (Erramilli, et al, 1997: 277-278).
The decline in FDI in Vietnam from 1996 has been especially pronounced in the hospitality and tourism sectors, where slow return on investment, complicated procedures and the communist government's "culture of secrecy" have served to disillusion many foreign investors (Sadi and Henderson, 2001: 78-80) . To this day, a number of barriers and pitfalls for foreign direct investment still exist in Vietnam. Besides the general hurdles to FDI already discussed in this paper, tourism projects are especially dependent on infrastructure, and tend to suffer from lagging infrastructure improvements, such as the promised but not-yet-built international airport on Phu Quoc Island, on which the future tourism development potential of the island will rely.
The lack of trustworthy market figures for Vietnam and continuing prevalence of opaque, inefficient and corrupt bureaucracy are further complications and sources of discouragement (Sadi and Henderson, 2001: 78-80 Until doi moi, the Vietnamese government was the only provider of tourist accommodation in the country, but now state enterprises no longer hold a monopoly and private and foreign investors have also become involved. As a result of the shortfalls mentioned above, the Vietnamese government became more aware of the importance of tourism infrastructure and sought to spur development by prioritizing joint venture investment in tourism (EIU, 1993: 63) .
Since the Vietnamese government and domestic sector lacked the knowledge and financial means to develop a progressive hospitality sector unassisted, the State Committee for Cooperation and Investment (SCCI) looked favorably on granting approval to foreign investment proposals for hotel development (ibid). A senior official of FIA stated that large foreign hotel chains also attracted their own loyal customers to Vietnam, bringing foreign exchange income into the country (Interview A, 2004) . Priority was put on refurbishing existing hotels to raise their standards. Hotel renovations were among the largest joint venture projects in terms of funds invested (Theuns, 1997: 314) .
Hotel development accounted for most of the tourism FDI in the early to mid 1990s, ranging from 57.5 per cent to 99.4 per cent of the yearly total (Erramilli, et al, 1997: 280 (Abbott and Abbott, 1996: 193; Travel Business Analyst, 1992: 19) , becoming the only five-star international standard hotel in the city. Many of the hotel's facilities and features, such as international direct dial phone lines, international booking, a business centre and credit card facilities, were unique in Ho Chi Minh City at that time. By 1990, three-quarters of the hotel's rooms were rented by foreigners on a long-stay basis (Saigon Tourist and Saigon Tourist Association, 1990 : 31, EIU, 1993 . The OCFC functioned as the 'facilitator' to help the project over bureaucratic hurdles and received full power of attorney for the project plus an annual fee of USD 750,000 and 15 per cent of profits (Travel Business Analyst, 1992: 20) . The waterborne structure evaded the ban on foreign ownership of land and became an instant sensation in the city, although Vietnamese were not allowed to enter. When it first opened, people set up seats on the bank and charged VND 500 per half-hour for a place to sit and watch the hotel (Biles, et al, 1999: 224 (Militante, 1993) . The lack of four and five-star accommodation in Vietnam in the early 1990s allowed hotels in this class to charge room rates of around USD 150 by 1993 (Michael, 1993) .
The New World Saigon Hotel, constructed as a joint venture between a state-owned enterprise and a Hong Kong investor, opened in 1994. With 552 rooms in its 14 storeys, it was the largest hotel in Vietnam and boasted quite possibly the first escalators in the city. The project was selffinanced, thus circumventing the ban on syndicated loans imposed by the US trade embargo.
Three-quarters of the USD 62.5 million budget was contributed by the Hong Kong investor New World, with Saigontourist Holding Company covering the balance (Michael, 1993) . 
The Roles of Foreign and Domestic Partners in FDI / Joint Venture Hotel Projects
The infusion of money and knowledge into the Vietnamese tourism industry are obvious contributions by foreign partners in FDI ventures. The General Director of the Huong Giang Tourist Co., for example, has declared that co-operation with foreign companies helps local operators to improve on the quality of their services, thus raising their competitiveness (Vietnam News Agency, 2006 (EIU, 1993: 69-70) . Domestic partners are also more familiar with navigating the Vietnamese and legal processes and more able to anticipate and adapt to the rapid changes that characterize transition-era Vietnam (Magnier, 1992 ).
An 'unwritten law' which gives the minority shareholder the same control and rights as the majority partner gives Vietnamese firms an added incentive to team up with foreign investors.
The inequity of this provision is one of a number of difficulties met by foreign firms wishing to enter into joint ventures in Vietnam. Once the firm has surmounted the initial hurdle of finding an appropriate local partner, an agreement must be reached that satisfies not only the two 20 partners, but also the government, which may demand substantial revisions before granting approval (Militante, 1993) . Even when an agreement is reached with the national-level governmental bodies, there is no guarantee that the provincial authorities will let a project go ahead (Interview B, 2004) .
Improvements in conditions for FDI in Vietnam Tourism
The Ties to the cumbersome government bureaucracy can prove a handicap for state-owned hotels.
One executive of a state-owned hotel mentioned that time-sensitive initiatives like publicity campaigns can be wrecked by the long wait for government approval of the campaign (Interview
D, 2004). Interviewees gave mixed responses as to the degree of autonomy that the General
Managers of state-owned hotels are granted. While one reported that he was free to make all dayto-day decisions in the running of his hotel without consulting a higher authority, another remarked that even the smallest of renovations cannot be authorized by the hotel manager without the funding and approval of the local government Labour Department. Although even managers themselves are not always sure in which cases they must ask permission and in which cases they are free to exercise their own discretion, in general any physical alteration to a building requires government approval. Several General Managers stated that government financial support for state-owned hotels for the most part has been withdrawn and each hotel must attract its own guests, organize its own financing and ensure its own profitability.
Challenges posed by FDI / Joint venture hotels
The recent proliferation of foreign joint venture hotels poses a challenge for existing non-jointventure state-owned hotels, which must now compete against hotels in quantity and quality that did not exist in their market before doi moi. In response, some hotels have established sales or marketing departments where previously a reservation department was deemed sufficient (Interview D, E, F, G, 2004) . The first sales department in a state-owned hotel was set up by the Majestic Hotel in Ho Chi Minh City in 1995, in direct response to the stiff competition brought by the highly profitable joint-venture Floating Hotel and Omni Saigon Hotel. These hotels served as both the impetus and the model for progressive management thinking in the state-owned hotels that were their direct competitors. The Director of Sales and Marketing at a state-owned hotel freely admits to learning about pricing and promotion from the hotel's joint-venture rivals.
Contrarily, a VNAT official denied that joint-venture hotels have had any effect on state-owned 23 hotels perhaps indicative of the degree to which state-owned hotels have assumed their own autonomy and must solve their own problems, which may not even be acknowledged at the governmental level (Interview F, K, 2004) .
Several General Managers of state-owned hotels acknowledged that with their global reach and experience and economies of scale, joint-venture hotels are able to offer bonuses such as discounts at their other hotels, and are more able to deal with international bookings and tracking-down of non-paying guests. Restricted in their scope to ventures inside of Vietnam, state-owned hotels cannot compete in these aspects.
Some state-owned hotels still rely heavily on government bodies to provide them with guests.
The Sapa Trade Union Hotel in Sapa in the North of Vietnam, for instance, caters mainly to domestic tourists including, as its name implies, trade union tour groups (Interview H, 2004) .
Such arrangements provide dedicated distribution channels for marketing as well as a steady source of clients. However, most state-owned hotels must compete in the same market as foreign and domestic private enterprises for the same pool of customers. Because state ownership of hotels is most prevalent among Vietnam's star-rated hotels, this requires that they predominantly address the foreign tourist market and interviewees expressed the expansion of their foreign customer base as an important goal.
Having previously received guests primarily from Eastern bloc countries, state-owned hotels 
Responses to challenges
Low price was often mentioned by the interviewees as one distinct advantage that state-owned hotels still retain against the joint-venture competition, to offset their lower standards of facilities and service. This price differential is partly a function of lower operating budgets due to lower provision of facilities and service and the hiring of local staff rather than foreigners. State hotel managers interviewed have said that they would very much like to hire foreign staff for higher positions in their hotels, in order to bring in foreign experience and attract foreign business, but cost is a severe limitation. One manager has said that she would have to pay a foreigner USD 1,000 to 2,000 a month for a position in which a Vietnamese would earn USD 400 to 500 (Interview F, 2004) . The management of two of the hotels at which interviews were conducted 25 decided to hire a single foreigner in an attempt to attract more foreign trade. Interestingly, in both cases the foreigner hired was a food and beverage staff member: in one case a manager and in the other case a chef (Interview E, F, 2004) .
The General Manager of a state-owned hotel said that foreign training manuals and videos are used to try to indoctrinate his staff in international standards of service. In 2004, the Rex Hotel received the environmental certificate ISO14001, for which it had been preparing for two years.
Recognition of the importance of environmental issues to Western guests was a primary impetus Some state hotels are expanding the services offered in-house to include amenities such as massage and travel services, rather than the rooms-only offering of pre-doi moi. It is common for small private operators to offer services and run businesses such as a dance club or gallery inside state-owned hotels, providing added income to the hotels through the rent they pay (Interview D, H, 2004) .
Outlook for the State-owned Sector
The 
